I already know of almost half a dozen Hungarians who are traveling individually, by car, or in groups, or who have made it to Afghanistan.
I did not encounter any kind of racist or hostile gesture.
More like a bureaucracy, rather, but actually I moved quite freely.
The world's largest sub-mine is right there, far away. It is already in Chinese hands.
Obviously, as a woman, I wouldn't feel comfortable in Afghanistan.
However, let's see what will happen in, say, three years or five years.
This is a longer period, during which I think a consensus may be formed.
I think Iran's goal is to have a zone from, say, the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean that belongs to it.
More importantly, his influence is his.
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Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome you to this week's broadcast of our program World Order.
My name is Tamás Maráci.
Employee of the mandate.
And this week, in this broadcast, we will talk about Iran, and previously about Afghanistan, two dangerous countries.
Also, my guest will probably confirm that they are not dangerous countries.
We are talking about the land of the Taliban, and it will become clear why he does not consider these two states dangerous.
Miklós Sárközi, Iranist historian, associate professor at the Károly Gáspár Reformed University.
Miklós, we'll admit the Nexus, if you'll allow it.
Thank you for visiting us.
I told you the context in the introduction, and I might also add that you visited Afghanistan at the end of last year from Iran,
but you just came home a week ago, and you've already visited the country twice this year.
We are talking about two states that were either involved in war, Afghanistan for twenty years,
or in relation to Iran's proxy allies, the current conflict in Gaza is also included.
And for Western tourists and professionals.
To anyone, entering there at first glance seems like it could be very dangerous.
If I remember our phone conversation yesterday correctly, you have already been to Central Asian countries over a hundred times.
if I understand correctly, you said number 64 in Iran, that based on these experiences,
the first, because you visited Afghanistan for the first time, depending on your 25 years of travel experience
what was the Taliban Afghan experience like at the end of last year?
My experiences with the current second Taliban government, or with the country they preceded
they were much better than I expected.
Obviously, I am being careful, since it has been a stand-alone system since the summer of 2021.
So I have to say that as if the Taliban know that or feel that,
that now the Gondoli position has given them power in Afghanistan for the second time,
and now they can't play it.
Or a more cautious environment.
They pursue a more considerate domestic and foreign policy, the basis of which is pragmatism.
When I mentioned the danger at the beginning of the broadcast,
then I mentioned this because I already looked through it, you gave one or two interviews since then,
and I see your Facebook posts,
that you naturally traveled as a group of tourists,
if I understand correctly, in Afghanistan.
Why do you say that when we know that this country is after 20 years of war?
We know that some states, Western states, the Taliban government,
he doesn't talk about not being considered an official representative of Afghanistan,
but they are considered a downright terrorist regime.
We also see that the images of war are in many of us,
even the escape and evacuation from Kabul two years ago,
that the Afghans also fled in panic,
who cooperated with the Americans from the Taliban.
And so the first creation really seems like going in there,
you wouldn't have life insurance from the west, at least for a European.
I think there is a double-talk here, so the international community has it on the one hand
trying to isolate the Taliban, his communication,
or Amnesty International
related to this, especially women's rights communication.
And there are those operating mainly based on economic interests, right?
a different kind of practical politicking, which is perhaps less vocal,
but it achieves even greater results, and this is true even in the case of individual countries.
So let's say it is not officially recognized by the Central Asian istans
on the official diplomatic line, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,
that this is the official name of the country, but at the same time they cheerfully cooperate,
they make economic agreements with them, without opening embassies,
or allow embassies to be opened in their territory.
And this is also useful for macro politics, so China is present in Afghanistan,
Turkey is present, Iran is present, Pakistan is present,
India is present, Russia is present.
I also met the Western, but Western diplomat when I arrived,
I traveled by plane, so with a German diplomat.
In addition, for example, I saw a development conference in Herat
which specifically had Western guests.
It was led by the current Taliban in Afghanistan.
What are the Taliban like anyway?
So when you arrive as a tourist and meet up close for the first time
with a human walking clerk, at the airport, with people,
or with security personnel in Kabul and during your travels,
so what impression did they make on you?
After all, you can now tell us what our perception is based on the Western media.
My first experience was with a Taliban, let's say a border guard, who spoke excellent English.
who helped me fill out that questionnaire,
which I had to present at the airport upon landing,
and for that in return I received a card with a photo,
which is verified.
My stay.
A distinguished young man who speaks English exceptionally well,
can be recognized by the way they are worn,
about their beards, their clothes, their hats,
most of them are Pashtuns,
and above the ethnic hat characteristic of the Pashtuns,
to know most of them.
So I have to say that the Tálep administration gave me a tourist visa.
I'm not the only tourist who goes in there
and I'm not the only group tourist
who goes in there, and I'm not the only Hungarian tourist,
who goes in there.
So I would like to point out that I already know about half a dozen Hungarians,
who come individually, or by car, or in groups,
or they entered Afghanistan.
Then we're still talking about foot steps, but once you've brought them into the picture,
how did you get there, how can you apply for a visa?
So you say it's not too difficult to get there,
but could you tell me roughly the steps that are public,
how to get, say, from Budapest to Kabul,
or into the interior of the country, what steps must be taken,
what kind of requirements, what kind of connection system is needed.
It's easier than no problem Onlinek.
So there really aren't a lot of places where it works
embassy or consulate.
To these embassy consulates, where by the tálepés
appointed staff are working, you can enter.
I, for example, in Dubai, at the Afghan embassy in Dubai,
and I got my visa at the consulate,
but you can get it in Peshawar, you can get it in Meshed, Iran,
obviously in one or two other places, i.e. in Central Pázia,
there are opportunities here at Tamott.
So someone, I had a group friend,
who took the visa in Peshawar, Pakistan,
and from there he traveled to Kabul and we met in Kabul.
When we say you are a scientist, you are a man of science,
obviously this is being checked somehow, I think
I don't know if it's in the visa or the interview at entry
do they check what kind of background you have,
but no matter how suspicious, that's what the tarebs live for,
that if a person comes from the west and they are also surprised,
why they want to look around the country,
or it is completely natural numbers.
For me in Meshed, not for the embassy in Dubai,
I will say that there was almost an organizer,
I traveled as part of a group tourism,
there was an organizer who asked for your travel news,
obtaining a visa, so only my passport,
I had to hand in my photo and a completed questionnaire at the hotel.
So I have no experience
the questioning of the embassy in the consulate.
Those who have been there say that it takes a maximum of two days
obtaining a visa issued by the Taliban.
So whoever is a field man there, or in a Peshawar,
or in Meshed, it also has to wait a maximum of two days.
There is no such pre-screening, obviously there are certain expectations,
but you have to give a photo where I look with a neutral face,
the wall should have a white background, so the wall should be white.
But apart from that, I really don't remember anything, there was no questioning.
Neither at the border nor anywhere else.
Where did you feel less tense and where tense in the country?
Because you...
There is obviously rural society, isn't it?
and there is Kabul, which is more of an international city,
however, during the tenths of the year, it is above the 70s and 60s
there was a western culture in the capital,
but in most countries it is.
How did you see the regions?
There are differences, that's true.
So Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic,
a country with many cultures and many identities,
and this can also be seen in the local politicization of the territories,
where they are quasi-conquerors,
and they are not at home, they are more careful about politics there.
In appropriate cases, this can also be strictness,
but there can also be openness.
So, for example, very few security checks
I went through, for example, in Herad, Western Afghanistan
the examination was much more and much stricter
Mazáres in Arif, northern Afghanistan,
where they checked our bags with such bomb-sniffing dogs,
the airport check took much longer both there and back.
But let me say that in Kabul,
wasn't even harder
on a trial basis, you have to be outside for three hours in front of the machines.
It was such a standard oriental comfort,
but apparently it is a well-oiled system.
Everyone knew where we were coming out,
the local organizers were waiting for us,
when the local taxi drivers were waiting for us there even before internal flights.
What I feel is that there was more bureaucracy and more control in the North.
So around Mazáres Arif, Balkh, Ajbak,
there were more checkpoints,
there was more bureaucracy.
Is there a reason for this, a security reason?
I think it was there in Mazáres Arif during the 1990s
there was such an atrocity, an incident,
where the Taliban were driven back with a very bloody head,
and they are not so popular there.
Uzbeks and Tajiks live there.
The majority of the Taliban belong to the Pashtun ethnic group.
You speak so Pashto.
No, I'm the Tajik
let's call it the Afghani Persian I understand and speak.
And did you communicate on that or in English?
I mostly communicated on this.
This is the language that the population is close to, let's say,
that 50 percent have their mother tongue,
and approx. 70-80 percent of the population speak English as a whole.
So the country has two official languages.
There is Dari, or Kabuli Persian,
and there is Pashto, right?
These are both Iranian languages, right?
but they are very far apart from each other.
Pashtun has approx. It has 18 million speakers.
This makes up 53 percent of the population.
The Dari, or somewhere else, is it Tajikistan further north,
it is a catchall term for various fellow students in Persian.
This is a lingua franca that, in my opinion, is more spoken
and is also spoken by many Taliban officials.
There was only one situation the whole way,
when I met a clerk who spoke only Pashto.
This was in Herat.
Whom I heralded.
He spoke to me in Pastúl throughout and did not change Dari.
In all other cases, the Taliban or non-Taliban local officials
they were able to speak Persian to me.
So you were in several parts of the country, obviously traveling,
I think separated by plane and car.
Was there an armed guard or security person with you?
So they set you free.
That's right, so the foreign office had a Pakistani subcontractor,
and he had a local Afghan subcontractor.
The security situation has really improved so much today,
that, for example, from Kabul, in Bamian, of which 250 kilometers,
you no longer have to go by plane, you can go by land and zip lines.
We did the same, we met, moving in tandem with us
with other foreign tourist groups, we stopped at fruit stands,
we stopped to buy bread or a snack in a traffic light.
So I have to say we arrived without much trouble.
Apparently there was a bigger inspection at the Bamian Valley,
hoteliers are strict.
So an important thing is that whatever hotel we went to,
in most cases there is a fairly strict check-out,
there was a motorcycle ride and a luggage check.
It is true that returning to the security question,
and my question would consist of two parts.
One applies to civilians, the other may
ethnic or terrorist groups.
And I would start with the civilian population,
that when you stopped to buy fruit
at a fork in the road, on the way,
or anywhere in the market, in Kabul, or in the countryside,
then to that twenty years of bloody war,
to which hundreds of thousands fell victim,
millions settled, were forced to leave their homes,
and apparently the Afghan population even sympathizes with the object compliments,
or not, for which the American is ultimately responsible,
I think it's like when a white man's summoner appears
from this far west, from Europe,
then you felt any aggression or unsympathy,
express countermeasures for the fact that the conquerors appeared again,
or the population can also choose this in two,
and you, as a tourist, were received with love and hospitality.
Rather the latter. So let's not forget here that we brought money to the country.
So subjects need income, right?
and among the local population too, isn't it true that every tourist moves families there,
or does it bring revenue to a restaurant.
I don't understand any kind of xenophobia, foreign enemy,
I did not feel a western enemy, a white enemy.
Nor verbally, but I obviously understand most of the local language,
or most of the speech, nor was there anything like that behind our backs.
We were in shops and souvenir shops, but I didn't meet them there either.
However, I had American travel companions, so there would have been plenty,
apartment, and it would have been a shame for such a thing to be said, wouldn't it?
but I really didn't encounter any kind of racist or hostile gesture.
Rather with such bureaucracy, rather,
but actually I moved quite freely.
Of course, this required a significant organizational force behind me.
So the big question is what would have happened if I went alone, for example,
or I drive a car, or a private car, or a jeep myself,
because there is such a thing, so that's why it's on the group tourism bus
it's obviously pre-fixed, organized things.
But it worked.
Yes, and the second half of the question is about
that the Taliban have consolidated public order.
Obviously, this is also their own interest, which half of the west,
or even half of the foreign international community demonstrate that
that the country is in good hands.
And he had the support of an anarchist in the previous government, didn't he?
so here is a contrast, they have an interest in presenting
what the public order is like.
But it is also in their interest to have another rival, or possibly hostile to them
jihadist, Islamist groups, say Al-Qaeda, were active,
we know this well, the Bin Laden era divides
he hid in the country for ten years,
or the Islamic State, which also has cells in Afghanistan,
or one could list such local jihadist organizations,
not be able to gain strength at the expense of the Taliban government.
I don't know how hermetically sealed this security policy is,
but it never crossed your mind when without an armed guard
you traveled the country that you are a very good destination,
you are a soft target when you move like this
for progenitor cells, or that it is not in the air.
If he had done that type of humiliation, I wouldn't have gone
to Afghanistan.
Have you had a preliminary assessment of security risks?
We had a previous preparation, so the travel page,
who organized the trip, with extremely thorough preparation
got us through. I think they are all kinds
guarantees have been obtained and all kinds of risks
they calculated. If I had any doubts, I wouldn't have gone
to Afghanistan. Once again, it wasn't me
the only Hungarian, and I was not the only group tourist,
and now they are already available for this year, so I can see them on quite a few websites
a Hungarian travel agency also advertises from Afghanistan,
so I have nothing to do with them, so it is not connected to me,
but there is already a Hungarian office that tells a lot about things.
I see that it is mostly for Afghanistan anyway
its northern western edge, its northern parts, and the vicinity of Kabul are
which can be freely averaged, that is, by the south, by the Pashtuns
residential zone maybe not much, so the area around Kandahar, let's say,
it may have cost little to tourism, or to travelers,
into the target charge, so apparently because it is a slow dissolution,
and the situation varies from province to province. I think my answer is
here are such security issues that the situation is different from province to province,
but obviously we are talking about an army of mouths now, right?
and they have all kinds of defenses, so their military arsenal
partly strengthened by inherited American weapons and partly
obviously they themselves are not so external, obviously archaic,
who wear flashy clothes but still have a professional core.
Of course, they have problems, especially not just Al-Qaida,
or I mean the cells of ISIS, but here, for example, is the one in Pakistan
afghan blitz, repatriation of afghan refugees in pakistan,
this is a significant burden that Pakistan is now trying to place on Afghanistan.
This I think is a more serious challenge that suddenly millions of people
being pushed back to Afghanistan.
Like any other threat.
By the way, the negotiators are really such that they declare peace,
we call consensus the secret of our success, our unity.
Such sentences appear in several places.
So, as I understand it, Ramzi Piruzi today, Vágtete today.
It's always there, or hands holding each other,
thus things that emphasize the unity of the country.
They are not trying to, right, in the former first subject,
under the former, to emphasize their own Talibanism,
or they irritate, less irritate local communities.
They say that, for example, Norus, the Iranian spring festival,
abolished as a public holiday, but they say
who wants to celebrate it privately, they have no objection.
There is no Christian community in Afghanistan.
So there are no Christian, Hindu, Sikh, or Jewish communities in Afghanistan at any level.
So Christians don't exist, because it's really coming.
Here is the Shia-Sunni distinction, so here mostly under the first subject administration,
especially the Hazaras suffered, right?
more than 12. the Shiite minority.
The roots of Hazarapastun hostility go back to the second half of the 19th century,
it flared up during the first object administration, but as if there too,
I have just visited the homeland, around Balmian,
isn't it in the Balmian valley, around the Bandeamér lakes,
you don't see any tension there at first either.
Obviously, if I lived there, it would be a different matter.
You can hear about ethnic Pashtuns being settled
to northern Afghanistan between Uzbeks and Tajiks,
which obviously causes tensions in the land tenure system,
in the agricultural property system, in water distribution.
A bigger problem is the water issue, for example,
and the purchase of agricultural goods.
But here the waiters approach things with a high degree of pragmatism,
and they feel the emphasis on regional cooperation.
So it buys electricity from Afghanistan, Tajikistan,
He buys food from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,
and takes fuel.
But they do the same with Türpenistan.
An Uzbek, Afghan, Pakistani railway line is being built.
With which they also want to improve the economic life of the country.
In Afghanistan, the bread we ate was mainly made from Kazakh flour.
Kazakhstan lost its European markets with the Russo-Ukrainian war,
and lost Iran, which Russia carried in its agricultural product space.
Instead, the Kazakhs are now investing in Afghanistan,
and they are very happy, on the one hand, that the Afghan market buys Kazakh flour,
on the other hand through Afghanistan, similar to the Uzbeks,
They are trying to acquire new markets towards Tajikistan and India.
So Afghanistan is both a transit country and a new market.
Tajikistan, which is the largest energy exporter in the Middle East,
for example, he was happy to report that the tables were news for a few weeks
the debt owed to Afghanistan since 2011 was paid.
And at the moment, negotiations are also underway to
how much electricity Afghanistan should buy from, for example, Tajikistan.
While in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
there is no official Taliban embassy.
And then here we come to the Chinese connection,
since it is coming at the end of China accepted an ambassador in Beijing,
and he himself sent a high-ranking diplomat,
I don't know whether in an ambassadorial capacity in Kabul.
This is a very interesting situation, because it is the international community
does not accept the Taliban regime in the official representatives of Afghanistan,
and this Islamic emirate China looks to recognize.
What fantasy they see, what minerals,
the Chinese saw other treasures in
that we should be active in such a barren Great Britain,
so the americans were in trouble too
what they can extract from Afghanistan.
When you get off the plane in Kabul,
you come out of the airport, you are greeted by a giant poster,
on which Chinese and Taliban officials shake hands,
and a Chinese Pashto, Dari trilingual post
keeps Chinese-Afghan friendship alive.
So this means that China is already under the previous Afghan regime
was incorporated into Afghanistan and was quickly created with the Taliban.
The Taliban were told that if the Taliban stopped
with the support of Uighur Muslim radical separatists,
then China will not raise any kind of objection against the Taliban emirate in Afghanistan,
and in return, don't they invest, what do they do,
isn't it, the world's largest sub-mine is far away.
It is already in Chinese hands.
Afghanistan has the specialty of not being modernized,
and there is no accurate survey of Afghanistan's mineral resources.
There are only estimates or tips for
that, for example, there are significant oil and natural gas fields in northern Afghanistan.
It would be a huge bulwark for China's eternal energy, wouldn't it?
since China shares a common border with Afghanistan.
It is not big, but there is a common border, the Valhanni corridor.
The fact that, for example, a serious highway at the Valhanni corridor,
or they are building some kind of serious border station.
In return, the Taliban obviously receive a significant amount of money,
but obviously I have seen Turkish-style mosques in rural Afghanistan,
so it's not just about China.
The ambassador of Turkey in Kabul announced
that Turkey has very big plans to rebuild Afghanistan.
Giant.
It is related to this.
Iran. Sorry, even Iran.
Iran is very active mainly around Herat in Western Afghanistan.
I was just now in the Iranian-Afghan border strip, also on the Iranian side,
where Afghan traders pass through.
A large Afghan delegation recently traveled to Meshed,
who asked that the Iranians treat them more flexibly,
the Afghans buy a huge amount of goods in Iran,
and thereby significantly spins the Iranian,
especially the...
the less milked eastern Iranian economy.
Then, of course, there are problems, so here, for example, is water.
Iran has an Iran-Afghan water sharing crisis,
here in connection with the Helmand River and in connection with the barrages there,
and there is the Kostepai project,
where the Taliban are digging a new canal from the Amu River,
this, in turn, taps the water flow of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,
and this is, for example, a new tension,
for which there is currently no solution.
So that's why...
let's be careful, there are pragmatic tricks here, right?
but there are, for example, water problems with the neighbors.
I would like to touch on two matters, and thus limit ourselves,
to keep such a framework for the speech, a lot could be said about it,
and then we will turn to Iran, but two more things in Afghan affairs.
One, you mentioned the Turkish mosque,
and this reminds me that when I was looking at your Facebook posts,
then an interesting thing caught my eye.
You say that they blew up the Bamian Buddha statues in 2001 on Islamist grounds, right?
right, and now when you go there you see
that the Taliban themselves are collecting, the museum has already been converted,
like many other pre-Islamic monuments, and they charge entrance fees,
and these artefacts are judged not to be detonated,
rather, they are put on public view with the intention of presenting them to tourists.
What is the reason that this change of attitude occurred in the ranks of an Islamist organization?
I think it was deduced in part perhaps from political wisdom,
the fact that half of the population is not of Pashtun origin, isn't it?
so, on the one hand, they want an inner peace, since we should not be stone-faced because
that the number of foreign tourists coming there is small, no matter how we look at it, we were a minority.
So there is domestic tourism here, the population wants to make gestures,
non-Pashtun or non-Taliban color group.
Kabul National Museum is open again, wasn't it a spectacular story,
since it was closed by the Taliban at the time, and the first Taliban government closed it before 2001,
and the treasures were put up for sale, weren't they?
The stupid statues in Balmian were blown up, right?
In comparison, you can now visit the National Museum, where I met school groups.
In Balmian, it's true that the Taliban official collects the ticket at the empty shadow of Balmian and the stupid statues,
which is a bittersweet experience because we can no longer see
but still the existing, the surviving debris, they are collected there in such a stone repository,
or I don't know what, in the form of an open-air museum.
So I think this is a sign of a kind of careful politicking,
which are therefore open elsewhere, I have seen other museums, in Balch or elsewhere.
So I think the current Taliban government is declaring it as what
it is written on the kaboly airport that we want to be at peace with the whole world.
And with the distribution of tourist visas, it is obviously a kind of quasi-propaganda,
or they are also carrying on a kind of communication, but then I really think that I perceive
that they use political tools that do not offend sensibilities carefully and spectacularly.
For example, our internet usage was not restricted.
So I was able to use my social media, still or not, I don't know.
I was able to see the British cemetery in Kabul, where Stein Aurel is and is buried.
So I think the Taliban know at this point that this takeover of theirs is still very fresh,
and maybe that's why they try to politicize a little cautiously.
In rural Mazar-e-Sharif, for example, there are Uzbeks and Tajiks.
So I wouldn't say that every office is occupied by the Taliban.
One such chief clerk stands at the head of, say, a museum,
for example, at the world-famous Herályti Citadel, a Taliban official or military official was in charge,
and we were there on friday and they say we can't go because it's friday because it's a muslim day.
But then we simply convinced him with kind words to let him in anyway, and he did.
Where there is conservatism and austerity, those are the mosques.
So, for example, we could hardly enter the mosques.
I have only been to two or three mosques in all of Afghanistan.
In this, for example, they apparently do not like the presence of foreigners or non-Muslims.
And women's equality, i.e. when will the change in attitude reach the political level,
when they also see that we referred to the history of Afghanistan in the 60s and 70s,
during a different regime, during a different system, such a western sharp style was typical.
There are shocking photos of Kabul that make it look like you were in Paris in disguise.
And obviously this does not pass without a trace, that a generation keeps it to itself.
This generation grows up in the light of a strict Islamist order.
And here we channel one more thing, because we did not discuss the matter of Christianity.
I was surprised by what you said about Christianity not existing,
because according to Open Doors' annual report
Afghanistan is the tenth most dangerous country in terms of Christian persecution.
Then, according to these proportions, such a survey was carried out,
then, according to them, there can be a microscopic group of Christians in Afghanistan,
and its persecution means that it is the tenth most dangerous country.
This is an A question, but my main question is women's rights.
How will this change in the future?
I think I don't think it will be sustainable in the long run
such a restriction against women.
For example, if the negotiators want consensus or peace in the countryside to
say nurses, nurses, gynecologists who treat women separately,
female doctors are needed, and their training must be solved sooner or later.
So one of my local tour guides complained that
that his wife is a doctor and is sent home.
So you cannot practice in a hospital.
And this is a really serious problem, it's a shame to deny it.
But right?
now the situation is that girls can go to school until the age of 12.
So it is not true that they could not go to school at all.
It can be up to the age of 12, so let's say they can complete 6 classes.
Above that, however, perhaps only in certain provinces
there are such private schools and private nursing schools,
whose status is decided by local Taliban chiefs.
So it is also an interesting thing that a kind of decentralization is characteristic,
women are allowed more in certain provinces,
in some places less.
But overall it's going to be a tough case,
and I think that, for example, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have already gotten used to the Taliban government,
to show more flexibility in this matter, for example,
so that women can also go to university,
or in some sense involve them in employment.
If the Taliban want to continue this kind of consensus-seeking policy,
and in general, they want to secure their image within the country in the long run,
then sooner or later I think they have to go in.
I'm not a weatherman, I don't have a magic ball,
but apparently this Taliban government avoids those spectacular anti-women,
gestures like they did in 2001.
There are women's clothing stores,
so in Herád I saw shops like
as if I had been to Iran or, say, Gulf Arabia.
Yes, wearing a burqa, for example, is optional,
so there are certain women who wear a burqa,
others, on the other hand, wear such chador-like clothes.
In the case of women, it is obviously irritating and unpleasant,
and obviously as a woman I wouldn't feel comfortable in Afghanistan.
But let's see what will happen in say three years or five years,
this is a longer period, during which I think a consensus may be formed.
Thank you, Miklós, for sharing these.
let's talk about Iran in the last quarter of our broadcast,
because it's also a fresh experience, although I don't mean that you've been there for the first time,
since I mentioned before the broadcast that you visited Iran 64 times.
That's a shocking number, when you told me that on the phone yesterday,
and it immediately occurred to me that there is a war tension here.
Iran, along with its proxy allies, is in the middle of a war hysteria,
maybe even its general, he said this as an Iranist,
how much he is in this war, how much he is not,
but when you enter there, especially not as a tourist, but as a tour guide,
or as a scientific specialist looking at, say, fellow diggers,
and you study things in museums, then in such a war neurosis
nor is he surrounded by the shadow of a suspicion, because people are really surprised
the news when a dual-citizen Iranian Brit enters to visit family,
and then goes to a prison for years.
And they find out that he came to his country as a spy.
So it never crossed your mind that you were in a war hysteria
could a European be in danger?
You'll be thrilled. There is no war hysteria in Iran.
So the Gaza war is not an everyday manna for the system,
that feeds people. So I was also in Iran, Teheran,
and I traveled through the eastern part of Iran, a relatively conservative religious area,
where he arrives as a spy in Gaza.
In connection with the war in Gaza, I saw a larger molino in the sanctuary of Meshedi Rezaimam,
where the names of 1,500 Gazan child victims were written in English and Persian.
In addition, there were some smaller posters like this, but apparently
I have seen a collection of donation boxes in a couple of stories for the Muslims of Gaza.
But apparently they are not forcing this topic.
There is a surprising reason that the majority of the Iranian population does not care about the war in Gaza,
or does not think about the events in Gaza in the way that the Iranian regime expects.
So in Iran, you can't get votes in an election with Gaza propaganda.
Now, at the beginning of March, there will be parliamentary elections in Iran,
and the system restrains itself by propagating the Gaza affairs in the open,
because they know that this would only keep the population at home even more before the vote.
As surprising as this is.
However, the Internet is censored there, unlike in Afghanistan,
so the big question is whether such a wave of demonstrations,
and after a very rough, brutal official action that we saw a year and a half ago,
after the Burka case, right?
After the Maxwell mini-case.
Yes, after the mini case.
Well, you can't do this tension there,
whatever if he controls our state media as if it never happened.
This is why the news of this spread, so many families were affected.
What was your experience? Of course, I can't think about this,
then talk like that.
But may.
I think I have friends with whom obviously
we can talk honestly about any things between our eyes.
I see that a lot of girls are still around now, aren't they?
she shows herself without a scarf, especially in big cities.
So in the case of young women, young girls,
so let's say that mainly in Tehran or big cities
there is still a lot of resistance to wearing a headscarf in the open street.
On the other hand, the system does not strive for these to be carried out by force,
rather such fines, or taking a photo, or sending such cautionary text messages.
One has the impression that my friends are also saying
that is why they do not act publicly against such women, or brutally,
because the elections are coming again.
And they don't want to incite the population before the elections,
they will see what kind of results will come into play.
The goal is to get as many people as possible to vote.
However, the prospects are not good.
The vote will probably now be one of the lowest of the direction of Islamic communities
his participation in the ongoing parliamentary election.
Even on directional television there are such strange videos,
where more casually dressed women appear on TV,
as if trying to wink
in such a slightly post-kadarist or kadarist way,
that it's not such a big deal
no need to worry, just go vote.
So now there's this weird thing,
that on the one hand I want to get women back into this headscarf thing,
on the other hand, they shun those brutal tools,
which we saw in the months after the Max-Flamini affair broke out.
But the spirit in the bottle was repelled,
or has it flown out and is floating there in the public life of the direction?
Official actions after the parliamentary elections will tell this,
that if, after the parliamentary elections, the current conservative or ultra-conservative majority
can maintain an absolute majority in the directional parliament,
then there are two possible answers.
Or it is that in possession of the power comfortably and generously
they turn a blind eye to this kind of wearing a headscarf on occasion,
or it is that now patience has run out, since we have been in power again for four years now.
So we can't decide this in advance,
but the fact that there is no police brutality,
there are such fines, or someone swipes their card in the subway,
you have your data, there are these types of things,
but otherwise obviously caution is more characteristic of the system,
either in connection with the Gaza affairs or in connection with the wearing of headscarves by women.
Let's talk more about the situation in Gaza, and there are two aspects here,
propaganda and politicization itself, the use of proxies, is a question of this.
I bring up the propaganda because it wouldn't have occurred to me,
yesterday, when we spoke on the phone, you drew attention to
that you, as an Iranist, possess the language and culture
you the Iranian, Teheran political communication, diplomatic messages
you can interpret it in a different context, practically in a cultural environment.
Could you tell me what you were thinking? Because we didn't discuss this on the phone,
but viewers might also be interested in this, that when there is a
that I only give examples that we as laymen see from the outside,
men gather, Friday, prayer I think, death to the Zionist entity,
death to America, the big tent and other communications or
the way diplomacy is carried out in nuclear matters, the way we preach peace from the outside,
the Persian state never conquered, not only defended itself,
we never attack, but at the same time we don't build nuclear bombs,
but still the International Atomic Energy Agency sees something.
So there is such a dichotomy here,
here is such a doublespeak that is characteristic of Islam,
but here we perceive a Persian diplomatic trick,
and you understand that. How do you interpret these messages?
It is always worth paying attention to who the given interviewer belongs to,
to which power group, which religious community,
because here there are nuances, so this is very important.
Outwardly, it seems uniform communications, but there are nuances.
Obviously, highlighting the victims of Gaza is the most important topic in the press at the moment,
and for the more radical groups, the cult of martyrdom is compelling.
So in Tehran you can see, for example, huge,
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard commanders, generals who fell or were killed in Syria,
as they are photographed in themselves,
or many people can see the picture of Soleimani, the picture of Kasszem Soleimani.
A new ski martyrology is emerging here,
whose main martyr is Soleimani, and the Syrians who have just fallen.
The emphasis on this is one of the interesting things.
The other thing, which I think is deliciously interesting, is the emphasis on the elements of patriotism.
As you said, so they are not attacking,
rather, they are presented as generals and patriots who protect their country.
This is mainly the case with Soleimani's cult.
And obviously in the case of proxies, we see them in Iranian rhetoric
primarily as bastions protecting Iran,
rather than the advanced stages of Iranian power politics.
So from abroad, in the West, they prefer to say that Iran,
these are such spheres of power of the Iranians, with which they spread Iran's influence.
On the Iranian side, however, they perceive this as such defensive lines,
which prevent any soldiers from entering the territory of, say, Iran.
Yes, only the problem here is that they operate in the territory of other states,
the Revolutionary Guard, and this is my last question for you.
At least 5-6 experts in this studio, not necessarily Iranists,
but a public expert familiar with Iran said almost the same thing,
that Iran has no interest in blowing up a regional state,
but they didn't rule it out, in fact, it was confirmed that Iran was for it
even as the mastermind in the October attack by Hamas,
or as the intellectual author, supporter, criminality,
he was there, and the connection with Hezbollah is obvious, isn't it?
actions against American soldiers in Iraq and Syria.
They are already known, the problem in the twenties is that the viewers
has obviously been known to students in recent months.
My question is, what does Tehran want?
Because that's the answer you said, it's an Iranian aspect.
Yes.
But these promotions took place on the territory of other states,
what does iran really want?
Obviously, the point of view represented by Iran is different,
and what other countries say about Iran is different.
I think Iran wants a power structure, a center of influence,
which extends from, say, the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.
This was already in the age of the Shah,
only then did it in American allied order,
and he had fewer allies there.
Ever since they changed their Shia Muslim identity, right?
or went to, they emphasize
Since then, alliances have been primarily based on religion.
I think Iran's goal is, let's say, from the Mediterranean Sea
up to the Indian Ocean should be a zone that belongs to him.
More specifically, his influence is his.
This can be safely said.
And here the goal is to overwrite the so-called Sykes-Picot borders.
More specifically, instead of the various such parastatals
and the support of militia structures.
And in this case, don't they think
that they from Lebanon through the ski crescent,
until they changed
today's Pakistanis or Afghans are spreading their tentacles.
But they are surprisingly successful in this, aren't they.
So this is mainly the southern part of Iraq, isn't it?
Certain parts of Syria or southern Lebanon
was very significantly influenced by direction.
And at the moment, I don't think Iran really wants war,
but he also doesn't want his influence to diminish.
Anyway, it's good for them now.
From the Iranian point of view, I now say characterization,
they already have two successes, so to speak, which they think are successes.
One is that they torpedoed the Israeli-Saudi Arabian war
diplomatic contact or official diplomatic recognition.
On the other hand, the anti-Israeli or anti-Western sentiments
its flare-up through the suffering in Gaza.
It is already bringing a significant mass of Middle Eastern Muslims closer to Iran.
They call this what they sell as success,
which is obvious, so it is important from the point of view of political gain.
So their goal is not to
this is destroyed, that this kind of state,
to preserve it in a way and to preserve it in the long term, that is their goal.
However, they obviously have challenges here, don't they?
for example, obviously, what will happen in the war between Hezbollah and Northern Israel
with an increasingly heated conflict.
There is no good recipe for this either.
They make sure that the direction army does not get into it,
however, they are obviously supported with ammunition, counseling, and training.
Miklós, I will close the conversation at this point,
to make it digestible for listeners and viewers.
Quite a lot of information has been given and we could continue from here
the analysis of the regional conflict, but then that should be another topic of conversation.
Thank you very much for being here and telling me these things.
I thank you very much.
Dear viewers and listeners, they heard and saw Miklós Sárközi.
This was our weekly broadcast about Afghanistan, Direction.
We will continue next week. Thank you for your attention. To see you again, to hear you again.